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Dr. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard's picture

Finding Greatness in China’s Greater Bay Area (GBA), part II: Implications for IFDI and OFDI

China’s Greater Bay Area (GBA), detailed in my last blog, appears an obvious magnet for inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and catalyst for outward FDI (OFDI). Beijing’s backing, infrastructure improvements, supportive government science and technology (S&T) policies, the GBA’s surfeit of supply networks, and the GBA’s scale and diversity should attract inward FDI (IFDI). The GBA’s role as a financial center and the relaxation of barriers to outward capital flows promise greater OFDI. Some question the GBA’s ability to realize its lofty aims given myriad barriers to internal flows, the vagueness of government plans, and dearth of true technology leaders.

Dr. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard's picture

Finding Greatness in China’s Greater Bay Area (GBA), part I: Diving into the Bay

Possessing about a decade-long lineage, China’s Greater Bay Area (GBA) formally began in 2017 with the signing of a Framework Agreement between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The objective is to create a mega economic cluster, involving 11 cities (e.g., Guangzhou, Dongguan, Hong Kong, Macao, and Shenzhen) that will be a leading international financial hub, a major global innovation center, a critical node between China and Southeast Asia, a world-class research center in fields such as biotechnology, and, more recently, a major link to China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Dr. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard's picture

The Digital Silk Road, part III-A Scan of Effects Shows Mixed Signals

This blog is the last of three on China’s Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative. The 1st gave an overview of the DSR while the 2nd probed some of DSR's features in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI) and contracting. This blog considers two potential political effects of the DSR, its effect on participant country relations with China and its effect on participant country political regimes and civil liberties. Regarding the former, there are concerns China’s DSR technologies will ensnare countries partaking of the DSR.

Dr. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard's picture

The Digital Silk Road, part II-Dialing Down the Hyperbole

My last blog supplied a basic overview of China’s Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative, part of its larger Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This blog represents a first cut at detailing the DSR. Unfortunately, as with the BRI, it is quite challenging to do so well. Reasons include the non-existence of a public, official list of DSR projects, the misclassification of technology-related foreign direct investment (FDI) in areas such as smartphone manufacturing and semiconductor packing and testing operations as DSR-space FDI even though they have nothing to do with connectivity, and the unwillingness of participant countries to disclose the terms of their contracting deals with China.

Dr. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard's picture

The Digital Silk Road, part I-Cloudy Networked World Calling

China’s Digital Silk Road (DSR), which is part of the larger Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), came into being in 2015 and accelerated after 2017. Broadly speaking, the DSR promotes connectivity in the information and communication technology (ICT) space and encompasses projects relating to artificial intelligence, cloud computing, fintech (e-payments), smart and safe cities, and telecommunications. It is not entirely clear how many countries are participating in the DSR, though it has been reported that 16 countries have signed DSR Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with China.

Dr. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard's picture

Circling around China’s Dual Circulation Policy, part III-Implications for China’s Outward FDI

This piece complements two earlier pieces that, respectively, overviewed China’s Dual Circulation System (DSC) and pondered its implications for inward foreign direct investment (FDI) into China. It specifically focuses on the potential ramifications of the DCS for Chinese outward FDI (OFDI). Prima facie one logically might expect the DCS to moderate Chinese OFDI since its goals include inter alia enhancing China’s indigenous capabilities, insulating China from an occasionally hostile external environment, and increasing domestic consumption and production. In actuality, though, these and other DCS aims do not support the premise the DCS will result in Chinese money shunning the outside world.

Dr. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard's picture

Circling around China’s Dual Circulation Policy, part II-Implications for Inward FDI

In my December blog, I overviewed China’s Dual Circulation System (DCS). To reiterate, foreign multinational corporations (MNCs) are concerned about the DCS’s emphasis on self-sufficiency, indigenous technology, and insulating China against the international market’s vagaries. Foreign MNCs, though, also see opportunities to satiate anticipated growth in domestic demand and the needs of a presumptively wealthier population, facilitate China’s efforts to promote high-quality development through inter alia the provision of “technology-focused products and services” (as one Michelin China CEO put it), and to supply the materials needed for China’s ramped up domestic infrastructure and production.

Dr. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard's picture

Circling around China’s Dual Circulation Policy, part I-Ins and Outs

In May 2020, China’s two-track “dual circulation” strategy (DSC) came to light. An internal circulation track—the “mainstay”—encompasses domestic consumption and production. An external circulation track entails more opportunities for foreign direct investment (FDI) and efforts to expand China’s external connections.

Dr. Amitendu Palit's picture

Resilient Supply Chain Initiative (RSCI) and its Prospects

Covid-19 is refashioning relations among countries. One example is the Resilient Supply Chain Initiative (RSCI), proposed by India, Japan, and Australia, which aims to assemble a coalition of countries, ostensibly middle powers and reasonably large economies, to restructure supply chains in a way that reduces economic dependence on China.

Dr. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard's picture

Small Waves Precede Tidal Waves: American Sanctions on Chinese Companies involved in South China Sea Island Building and their Larger Ramifications

The United States (US) Department of Commerce recently blacklisted two dozen Chinese firms which it said, “played a ‘role in helping the Chinese military construct and militarize the internationally condemned artificial islands in the South China Sea.’” Companies listed included Guangzhou Haige Communications Group, China Shipbuilding Group, and China Communications Construction Co. (CCCC). The US State Department later accused CCCC and its subsidiaries of “‘corruption, predatory financing, environmental destruction and other abuses.’”

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*Blogs represent the views of their authors and are not necessarily endorsed by the Wong MNC Center, its Board of Directors, or its Advisory Board. They are intended for the non-commercial use of readers in order to foster debate and discussion and to facilitate and stimulate research.