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Dr. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard's picture

The BRI is Dead? Long Live the BRI?, Part II- Accelerants Allover with Sporadic Retardants

My last blog highlighted the debate raging about the health of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).[1] It also reviewed the economic and political rationales for China’s ambitious scheme.

Dr. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard's picture

The BRI is Dead? Long Live the BRI? Part I: Present at the Creation

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which consists of two main components, the sea-focused Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) and the land-focused Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), came into being in 2013.[1] Since Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the MSRI and the SREB, there has been considerable positive and negative froth about the BRI. Enthusiasts have lauded the BRI as a foundation for building a community of common interests, solving infrastructure gaps in the developing world, helping countries industrialize, expanding people-to-people exchanges, and pluralizing international relations.

Dr. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard's picture

China and IPR, part IV-Innovating Chinese IPR Improvements

This is the last in a four-part series that has looked inter alia at debates surrounding China’s protection of foreign intellectual property (IP) rights (IPR), detailed China’s problematic fulfillment of its IPR commitments, and examined various factors potentially driving China’s poor compliance with its IPR obligations. The focus of this blog is on enumerating a variety of measures that governments and businesses, particularly the former, should embrace to deal with the China challenge to foreign IPR.

Dr. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard's picture

China and IPR, part III-Caring about Causes

In my last blog, I detailed China’s continuing shortcomings with protecting intellectual property (IP) rights (IPR) and the emergence of new challenges. The question arises as to why these problems persist even though it has been more than 20 years since China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), is a member of numerous IP-focused organizations such as the World Intellectual Property Organization, and faces constant pressure to improve its protection of foreign IP. This blog critically evaluates some of the most common explanations for this state of affairs. Such knowledge is critical for developing realistic business and policy recommendations.

Dr. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard's picture

China and IPR, part II-Patent (Copyright) (Trademark) (Etc.) Facts

This commentary explores China’s fulfillment of its intellectual property (IP) rights (IPR) obligations.[1] Herein, “compliance” requires more than Beijing’s embrace of policies, passage of laws, adoption of regulations, creation of IP administrative entities, or restructuring of its c

Dr. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard's picture

China and IPR, part I-A Persistent Problem with Property?

China’s protection of intellectual property (IP) remains a continuing and serious issue for foreign companies as the United States Trade Representative (USTR) made manifest in its 2021 Section 301 report and 2021 Report to Congress on China’s World Trade Organization (WTO) Compliance and the European Commission conveyed clearly in its 2021 Repor

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Finding Greatness in China’s Greater Bay Area (GBA), part III: The GBA as (yet) another “Silicon Valley”

This series’s first blog notes the GBA seeks to create a global innovation, research, and technology hub in the mold of “Silicon Valley.” There are many reasons to expect success. These range from a “cocktail of inputs” including massive government support to huge capital pools to a strong ecosystem for research to prominent artificial intelligence, health tech, robotics, smart city, and telecommunications players with extensive patents and research and development (R&D) spending to broad and deep (and continuously improving) hard infrastructure.

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Finding Greatness in China’s Greater Bay Area (GBA), part II: Implications for IFDI and OFDI

China’s Greater Bay Area (GBA), detailed in my last blog, appears an obvious magnet for inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and catalyst for outward FDI (OFDI). Beijing’s backing, infrastructure improvements, supportive government science and technology (S&T) policies, the GBA’s surfeit of supply networks, and the GBA’s scale and diversity should attract inward FDI (IFDI). The GBA’s role as a financial center and the relaxation of barriers to outward capital flows promise greater OFDI. Some question the GBA’s ability to realize its lofty aims given myriad barriers to internal flows, the vagueness of government plans, and dearth of true technology leaders.

Dr. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard's picture

Finding Greatness in China’s Greater Bay Area (GBA), part I: Diving into the Bay

Possessing about a decade-long lineage, China’s Greater Bay Area (GBA) formally began in 2017 with the signing of a Framework Agreement between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The objective is to create a mega economic cluster, involving 11 cities (e.g., Guangzhou, Dongguan, Hong Kong, Macao, and Shenzhen) that will be a leading international financial hub, a major global innovation center, a critical node between China and Southeast Asia, a world-class research center in fields such as biotechnology, and, more recently, a major link to China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Dr. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard's picture

The Digital Silk Road, part III-A Scan of Effects Shows Mixed Signals

This blog is the last of three on China’s Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative. The 1st gave an overview of the DSR while the 2nd probed some of DSR's features in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI) and contracting. This blog considers two potential political effects of the DSR, its effect on participant country relations with China and its effect on participant country political regimes and civil liberties. Regarding the former, there are concerns China’s DSR technologies will ensnare countries partaking of the DSR.

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*Blogs represent the views of their authors and are not necessarily endorsed by the Wong MNC Center, its Board of Directors, or its Advisory Board. They are intended for the non-commercial use of readers in order to foster debate and discussion and to facilitate and stimulate research.