Blog*

In January 2024, Congressman Mike Gallagher, the Chair of the United States (US) House Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, introduced the “Biosecure Act,” which prohibits the US government (USG) from “procuring or obtaining biotechnology equipment or services produced or provided by a biotechnology company of concern,” participating in a c

China, as you would expect, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) participants and proponents, and even data support some of the positive sentiment in, if not the logic of, the previous blog in this four-part series on the future of the BRI, which highlighted numerous factors likely to continue propelling the BRI.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which consists of two main components, the sea-focused Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) and the land-focused Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), came into being in 2013.[1] Since Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the MSRI and the SREB, there has been considerable positive and negative froth about the BRI. Enthusiasts have lauded the BRI as a foundation for building a community of common interests, solving infrastructure gaps in the developing world, helping countries industrialize, expanding people-to-people exchanges, and pluralizing international relations.

In my last blog, I detailed China’s continuing shortcomings with protecting intellectual property (IP) rights (IPR) and the emergence of new challenges. The question arises as to why these problems persist even though it has been more than 20 years since China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), is a member of numerous IP-focused organizations such as the World Intellectual Property Organization, and faces constant pressure to improve its protection of foreign IP. This blog critically evaluates some of the most common explanations for this state of affairs. Such knowledge is critical for developing realistic business and policy recommendations.

China’s protection of intellectual property (IP) remains a continuing and serious issue for foreign companies as the United States Trade Representative (USTR) made manifest in its 2021 Section 301 report and 2021 Report to Congress on China’s World Trade Organization (WTO) Compliance and the European Commission conveyed clearly in its 2021 Repor