The BRI is Dead? Long Live the BRI? Part IV-Bad Flail at the Rail(way) or How Not to Confront the BRI

Dr. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard's picture

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has generated so much commentary that it is conceivable that if one printed out all the relevant pages and laid them end-to-end the length might approach that of all the railway track laid under the aegis of the BRI![i] Further commentary seems even more pointless given the growing body of opinion that the BRI is dead or dramatically diminished.[ii] On the other hand, no one seems to have told countries in the Middle East or Southeast Asia (SEA) which continue to participate actively or seek deeper involvement in China’s scheme.[iii] Neither does Beijing seem aware of the BRI’s death or severe impairment and, indeed, it continues to tout its value, promote it, and defend it against critics.[iv] If the BRI was completely on the road to nowhere, one would think that Beijing would acknowledge its limits, artfully of course, as a way to disassociate itself from the burdens associated with being its leader and its shortcomings. Neither the United States (US) nor the European Union (EU) seems to have gotten the memo. In fact, they persist in maligning the BRI and advancing countermeasures.[v]

As previewed in earlier blogs, this blog, the last in a 4-part series on the BRI, describes some of these countermeasures, ponders their limits, and suggests some better routes. One recent grand initiative is the Indo-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). This venture, launched in October 2023, involves the EU and the US as well as individual European companies, India, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and the World Bank and envisions the development of railway, power, telecommunications, logistics, and maritime connections that would more tightly link South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.[vi] The following month, the US, the EU, the African Development Bank, and the Africa Finance Corporation signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the development of a multi-billion dollar trans-African corridor, under the aegis of the G-7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, encompassing railways, telecommunication networks, and energy infrastructure spanning Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Zambia.[vii] Not surprisingly the EU has decided to flash a little pomp itself by hosting a Global Gateway Forum in late October 2023 to tout its BRI alternative and advance various development initiatives.[viii]

“Western” governments and pundits are quite aware that the former’s offerings lack the flare and scale of Chinese ones. For some the answer is to bolster Western offerings with more money, programs, and messaging.[ix] One writer goes so far as to advocate the EU foster a BRI “‘with liberal democratic characteristics’” centered around Europe with links that are “deeper” and more “mutually beneficial” than China’s.[x] For others, confident that China’s BRI is flawed and/or going nowhere, the solution is programs that are more open, fair, and transparent than China’s.[xi] One problem with existing and these proposed responses to the BRI is that they are based on misunderstandings or, worse, ignorance, of what actually is happening and what is driving what has happened. Too often, policy responses are based on exaggerations of BRI’s successes and shortcomings as well as misunderstanding or ignorance about the political roots of BRI successes and failures. A second failing of extant policies is the apparent desire to match the scale and breadth of China’s BRI, which only stretches already limited resources further and magnifies the likelihood of managerial failures, small economic successes, and stunted political payoffs. A third problem is the continued insistence on attaching standard Western political, economic, environmental, and social conditions to BRI counterinitiatives. This will diminish host/participant country buy-in, slowdown project progress, and program tailoring. Fourth, collective programming has its merits, but also neglects that Western responders have their own areas of expertise as well as historical baggage. Finally, extant programs too often ignore the imperative of satisfying policymaker domestic political needs as a way to foster program adoption and success.

To get on the right track, Western governments first need a better understanding of the BRI challenge and their end goals.[xii] In this vein, they need to break out of their analytical bubbles and use the insights of those uncovering the real situation on the ground. In addition, they need to design their initiatives better—they need to pursue projects that meaningfully improve infrastructure, have visibility, and will occur. They also need to think carefully about the standards that they attach to their countermeasures. This is not a call for dropping standards, but a call for situational flexibility. Rigidity ensures rejection and rejection guarantees China’s standards will predominate. In order to move forward, Western countries also should divide up areas of responsibility geographically and sectorally. This will facilitate better fit and improve the prospects for success. Lastly, Western countries need to think how they can satiate the domestic political needs of BRI host/participant country policymakers. This does not necessarily require adjusting BRI counterinitiatives: new or modifications to other initiatives may suffice.

The BRI is not getting the attention that it used to, but it is not going away even if renamed, tweaked, or downsized somewhat.[xiii] Western governments continue to mobilize their economic and political capital in an effort to blunt the BRI’s political and economic impact and channel it in a direction more to their liking. They will not succeed if they persist along the same ole’ road. In the final analysis, dealing with infrastructure like seaports, highways, power grids, telecommunications system, and railways requires the proper infrastructure, too.




[i] For the interested reader, background on the BRI in various regions of the world, albeit with a maritime focus, can be found in Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, ed., China’s Maritime Silk Road and South Asia (Singapore: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018); Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, ed., China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative and Southeast Asia (Singapore: Palgrave MacMillan, 2019); and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, ed., China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative, Africa, and the Middle East (Singapore: Palgrave MacMillan, 2021).

[ii] These views are treated in Xue Gong, “The Belt and Road Initiative is Still China’s ‘Gala’ but Without as Much Luster,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Commentary, March 3, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/03/03/belt-and-road-initiative-is-sti... Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, “The BRI is Dead? Long Live the BRI? Part I: Present at the Creation,” March 29, 2023, Wong MNC Center Blog, https://mnccenter.org/blog/bri-dead-long-live-bri-part-i-present-creation; and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, “Pondering the BRI’s Alleged New Roads,” East Asia Forum, November 24, 2023, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/11/24/pondering-the-bris-alleged-new-....

[iii] Mordechai Chaziza, “A Decade of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the Middle East,” The National Interest, June 4, 2023, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/decade-china%E2%80%99s-belt-and-roa... Jan Yumul, Yang Han, and Liu Yifan, “BRI to Boost China Ties with ASEAN, Mideast,” China Daily, September 14, 2023, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202309/14/WS65030ef1a310d2dce4bb5ce4.html; Prashanth Parameswaran, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia: The Next Decade,” The Diplomat, November 16, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/11/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-in-south....

[iv] Liang Haiming and Feng Da Hsuan, “BRI Has Led to Common Growth, Not Debt Trap,” China Daily, September 18, 2023, https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202309/18/WS6507ab75a310d2dce4bb63c3.... Ding Feng and Denise Jia, “China Central Banker Pushes Banks to Expand along Belt and Road,” Nikkei Asia, September 29, 2023, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Caixin/China-central-banker-pushes-ban... and Ken Moritsugu, “China Touts its Belt and Road Infrastructure Lending as an Alternative for International Development,” AP, October 10, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/china-belt-road-development-africa-69d6a22fba.... This does not deny there have been some adjustments in terms of targeted sectors, regions, and countries and the form and amount of contribution China will make to the BRI. See, e.g., Amy Chew, “ASEAN to Stay Priority for China’s BRI Investment Despite Slowdown,” Nikkei Asia, September 21, 2023, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/ASEAN-to-stay-priority-f....

[v] One piece emphasizing American countermeasures is Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, “The United States-China Rivalry and the BRI,” Vestnik RUDN International Relations, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2021), pp. 290-305,

[vi] Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, “The Indo-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC): Another Connectivity Scheme Headed off the Rails?” Wong MNC Center Hot News, Cool Analysis, October 4, 2023, https://mnccenter.org/news/indo-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor-ime....

[vii] Matthew Hill, “The US and EU Plan $1 Billion-Plus Africa Rail Link for Key Minerals,” Bloomberg, November 1, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2023-11-01/supply-chain-lates... and David Rogers, “G7 Launches $600bn trans-African Railway to Counter China’s Belt and Road,” Global Construction Review, November 3, 2023, https://www.globalconstructionreview.com/g7-launches-600bn-trans-african....

[viii] Jorge Valero, “EU Set for Own Summit in Bid to Rival China Belt and Road,” Bloomberg.com, October 19, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-19/eu-preps-for-own-summ....

[ix] Olaf Wietnzek, Jonas Nitschke, and Louis Bout, “‘Global Gateway’ Slowly Gathers Momentum,” Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Country Reports, October 30, 2023, https://www.kas.de/en/country-reports/detail/-/content/global-gateway-ni....

[x] Martin Sanbu, “The EU Should Aim for Its Own Belt and Road,” Financial Times, July 16, 2023.

[xi] Alan Beattie, “How the US and Europe Can Beat China’s Belt and Road,” Financial Times, June 29, 2023; and

[xii] On the importance of recognizing end goals, see Wietnzek, Nitschke, and Bout, “‘Global Gateway’ Slowly Gathers Momentum” (October 30, 2023).

[xiii] Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, “The BRI is Dead? Long Live the BRI? Part II-Accelerants Allover with Sporadic Restraints,” Wong MNC Center Blog, June 18, 2023, https://mnccenter.org/blog/bri-dead-long-live-bri-part-ii-accelerants-al... and Blanchard, “Pondering the BRI’s Alleged New Roads” (November 24, 2023).