Dr. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard's blog

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which consists of two main components, the sea-focused Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) and the land-focused Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), came into being in 2013.[1] Since Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the MSRI and the SREB, there has been considerable positive and negative froth about the BRI. Enthusiasts have lauded the BRI as a foundation for building a community of common interests, solving infrastructure gaps in the developing world, helping countries industrialize, expanding people-to-people exchanges, and pluralizing international relations.

In my last blog, I detailed China’s continuing shortcomings with protecting intellectual property (IP) rights (IPR) and the emergence of new challenges. The question arises as to why these problems persist even though it has been more than 20 years since China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), is a member of numerous IP-focused organizations such as the World Intellectual Property Organization, and faces constant pressure to improve its protection of foreign IP. This blog critically evaluates some of the most common explanations for this state of affairs. Such knowledge is critical for developing realistic business and policy recommendations.

China’s protection of intellectual property (IP) remains a continuing and serious issue for foreign companies as the United States Trade Representative (USTR) made manifest in its 2021 Section 301 report and 2021 Report to Congress on China’s World Trade Organization (WTO) Compliance and the European Commission conveyed clearly in its 2021 Repor

China’s Greater Bay Area (GBA), detailed in my last blog, appears an obvious magnet for inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and catalyst for outward FDI (OFDI). Beijing’s backing, infrastructure improvements, supportive government science and technology (S&T) policies, the GBA’s surfeit of supply networks, and the GBA’s scale and diversity should attract inward FDI (IFDI). The GBA’s role as a financial center and the relaxation of barriers to outward capital flows promise greater OFDI. Some question the GBA’s ability to realize its lofty aims given myriad barriers to internal flows, the vagueness of government plans, and dearth of true technology leaders.

This blog is the last of three on China’s Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative. The 1st gave an overview of the DSR while the 2nd probed some of DSR's features in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI) and contracting. This blog considers two potential political effects of the DSR, its effect on participant country relations with China and its effect on participant country political regimes and civil liberties. Regarding the former, there are concerns China’s DSR technologies will ensnare countries partaking of the DSR.