The BRI is Dead? Long Live the BRI? Part IV-Bad Flail at the Rail(way) or How Not to Confront the BRI

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has generated so much commentary that it is conceivable that if one printed out all the relevant pages and laid them end-to-end the length might approach that of all the railway track laid under the aegis of the BRI![i] Further commentary seems even more pointless given the growing body of opinion that the BRI is dead or dramatically diminished.[ii] On the other hand, no one seems to have told countries in the Middle East or Southeast Asia (SEA) which continue to participate actively or seek deeper involvement in China’s scheme.[iii] Neither does Beijing seem aware of the BRI’s death or severe impairment and, indeed, it continues to tout its value, promote it, and defend it against critics.[iv] If the BRI was completely on the road to nowhere, one would think that Beijing would acknowledge its limits, artfully of course, as a way to disassociate itself from the burdens associated with being its leader and its shortcomings. Neither the United States (US) nor the European Union (EU) seems to have gotten the memo. In fact, they persist in maligning the BRI and advancing countermeasures.[v]

As previewed in earlier blogs, this blog, the last in a 4-part series on the BRI, describes some of these countermeasures, ponders their limits, and suggests some better routes. One recent grand initiative is the Indo-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). This venture, launched in October 2023, involves the EU and the US as well as individual European companies, India, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and the World Bank and envisions the development of railway, power, telecommunications, logistics, and maritime connections that would more tightly link South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.[vi] The following month, the US, the EU, the African Development Bank, and the Africa Finance Corporation signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the development of a multi-billion dollar trans-African corridor, under the aegis of the G-7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, encompassing railways, telecommunication networks, and energy infrastructure spanning Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Zambia.[vii] Not surprisingly the EU has decided to flash a little pomp itself by hosting a Global Gateway Forum in late October 2023 to tout its BRI alternative and advance various development initiatives.[viii]

“Western” governments and pundits are quite aware that the former’s offerings lack the flare and scale of Chinese ones. For some the answer is to bolster Western offerings with more money, programs, and messaging.[ix] One writer goes so far as to advocate the EU foster a BRI “‘with liberal democratic characteristics’” centered around Europe with links that are “deeper” and more “mutually beneficial” than China’s.[x] For others, confident that China’s BRI is flawed and/or going nowhere, the solution is programs that are more open, fair, and transparent than China’s.[xi] One problem with existing and these proposed responses to the BRI is that they are based on misunderstandings or, worse, ignorance, of what actually is happening and what is driving what has happened. Too often, policy responses are based on exaggerations of BRI’s successes and shortcomings as well as misunderstanding or ignorance about the political roots of BRI successes and failures. A second failing of extant policies is the apparent desire to match the scale and breadth of China’s BRI, which only stretches already limited resources further and magnifies the likelihood of managerial failures, small economic successes, and stunted political payoffs. A third problem is the continued insistence on attaching standard Western political, economic, environmental, and social conditions to BRI counterinitiatives. This will diminish host/participant country buy-in, slowdown project progress, and program tailoring. Fourth, collective programming has its merits, but also neglects that Western responders have their own areas of expertise as well as historical baggage. Finally, extant programs too often ignore the imperative of satisfying policymaker domestic political needs as a way to foster program adoption and success.

To get on the right track, Western governments first need a better understanding of the BRI challenge and their end goals.[xii] In this vein, they need to break out of their analytical bubbles and use the insights of those uncovering the real situation on the ground. In addition, they need to design their initiatives better—they need to pursue projects that meaningfully improve infrastructure, have visibility, and will occur. They also need to think carefully about the standards that they attach to their countermeasures. This is not a call for dropping standards, but a call for situational flexibility. Rigidity ensures rejection and rejection guarantees China’s standards will predominate. In order to move forward, Western countries also should divide up areas of responsibility geographically and sectorally. This will facilitate better fit and improve the prospects for success. Lastly, Western countries need to think how they can satiate the domestic political needs of BRI host/participant country policymakers. This does not necessarily require adjusting BRI counterinitiatives: new or modifications to other initiatives may suffice.

The BRI is not getting the attention that it used to, but it is not going away even if renamed, tweaked, or downsized somewhat.[xiii] Western governments continue to mobilize their economic and political capital in an effort to blunt the BRI’s political and economic impact and channel it in a direction more to their liking. They will not succeed if they persist along the same ole’ road. In the final analysis, dealing with infrastructure like seaports, highways, power grids, telecommunications system, and railways requires the proper infrastructure, too.