Why did China and India, despite their similar natural factor endowments and growth trajectories, attract different types of FDI? This article shows that microlevel institutions in China and India, particularly a set of regulations governing labor and land markets, shape their domestic labor mobility and consequently affect their FDI patterns and development paths. China’s high labor mobility motivates foreign firms to concentrate in labor-intensive manufacturing and exploit the benefits of scale economies.
The growing presence in Latin America of Chinese companies, private and state-owned, impacts on China’s international image globally, for in spite of the growing diversity of actors involved, the Western public, their media and governments, tend to conceive of China as a unified actor. Indeed, this is a perception encouraged by Beijing’s leaders when they tour the region.
Victor Zitian Chen, Jing Li, and Daniel M. Shapiro
This study extends the classic country-specific advantage (CSA) – firm-specific advantage (FSA) framework by integrating an institution-based view of CSAs into the discussion of FSAs. In his classic CSA – FSA framework, Alan Rugman suggests that successful multi-national enterprises (MNEs) are often built on the interaction between strong FSAs and strong CSAs at home.
When the Syriza government of Alexis Tsipras took office in Greece in January 2015, one of the first of many shocking announcements was the cancellation of the privatization of the Piraeus Port Authority (OLP in Greek), which controls the ancient port of Athens.[1] The Chinese state-owned company China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO), which had been managing two terminals on the port since 2008, was widely expected to become the new majority owner. Why was the Piraeus transaction singled out as an example of a Chinese investment that had to be stopped?
This piece is an expanded version of a blog that I published on the Mr. & Mrs. S.H. Wong MNC Center website on August 24 (https://mnccenter.org/blog/loco-about-localization-obvious-not-chinese-c...). It discusses at greater length the issues associated with Chinese outward FDI and political localization, Chinese government awareness of the necessity of political localization, and some of the questions that need to be considered for there to be effective political localization.
For the past three decades the People’s Republic of China has been undergoing major internal socioeconomic transformations and has seen its position in the world economy shift. China’s rapid globalization has not gone unnoticed in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). China has significantly increased its presence in the region via international organizations such as the United Nations and regional organizations.
China's energy sector is under pressure to achieve secure and affordable supply and a clear decarbonisation path. We examine the longitudinal trajectory of the Chinese electricity supply security and model the near future supply security based on the 12th 5 Year Plan. Our approach combines the Shannon–Wiener, Herfindahl–Hirschman and electricity import dependence indices for supply security appraisal. We find that electricity portfolio innovation allows China to provide secure energy supply despite increasing import dependence.
The effect of Chinese outward investment (COI) on host country corruption levels, government accountability, and transparency has been a topic of considerable interest among activists and scholars as well as businesspeople and policymakers who fret Chinese malfeasance is putting their firms at a competitive disadvantage. For various reasons, concern is well warranted. On top of this, there are a number of conceptual reasons to be concerned about the link between COI and corruption levels. There is not an open and shut case about the link between COI and corruption levels, however.
By employing a comparative method that analyzes China’s increasing presence in dierent Latin America countries, this study explores key features and implications of Beijing’s approach towards this region. Colombia, Ecuador and Peru are used as case studies to evaluate China’s diplomatic rhetoric and the degree to which trade and investment realities live up to the goals proclaimed. Each of the countries examined seeks a more balanced relationship with external actors and recognizes China’s increased presence in the domestic political economy.
This paper draws on the two-level game approach to analyze the influence of domestic politics on U.S.-China trade disputes in alternative energy, especially in solar energy. It suggests that the difficulty Washington faces in getting China to address market access barriers in renewable energy needs to be viewed in light of both the coalitional dynamics in the U.S. resulting from the specific bilateral trade and investment relationship in this sector and Beijing’s willingness to use industrial policy to foster economic competitiveness in nascent industries.
