COFDI

This piece complements two earlier pieces that, respectively, overviewed China’s Dual Circulation System (DSC) and pondered its implications for inward foreign direct investment (FDI) into China. It specifically focuses on the potential ramifications of the DCS for Chinese outward FDI (OFDI). Prima facie one logically might expect the DCS to moderate Chinese OFDI since its goals include inter alia enhancing China’s indigenous capabilities, insulating China from an occasionally hostile external environment, and increasing domestic consumption and production. In actuality, though, these and other DCS aims do not support the premise the DCS will result in Chinese money shunning the outside world.

ByteDance is facing up to USD $6 billion in losses from the Indian government’s decision to ban almost five dozen Chinese mobile phone apps including its Tik Tok and Helo.

European countries like Germany, the United Kingdom, and Norway have been struggling over the extent to which they should use equipment and services and accept foreign direct investment (FDI) from Chinese telecommunication firms.

These days “Washington” seems to think little of Chinese investment. It does not matter if it is Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in the United States (US) or US FDI in China. Importantly, the core concerns in each case are different.

Chinese outward foreign direct investment (FDI) is not a particularly new story as far as European Union (EU) countries are concerned.